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budget will grow substantially. At the same time, the present four poor EU countries will resist any cuts in their transfers from the EU budget. Consequently, while the Eastern European countries can expect to receive significant net transfers, these will be substantially below the levels associated with present budget rules (cf. also Baldwin, 1995 and Baldwin et al., 1997) .
Another possible reason for the CEECs to seek EU membership is connected to the improvement of conditions for trade with the EU through the reduction of remaining EU tariffs, the elimination of non-tariff barriers in the agricultural sector and membership in the single market. However, since tariffs on EU imports from the CEECs as well as EU non-tariff barriers are already low and will be reduced further under the Europe agreements, it is more likely to be the guaranteed access to the large EU market that motivates the CEECs to seek EU accession: Full EU membership will protect the Eastern European from any protectionist vogue that might raise EU trade barriers again, e.g. through anti-dumping policies.
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This paper argues that besides transfers, further reductions in trade barriers and guaranteed market access EU membership may enhance the credibility of economic reforms in the Eastern
European countries through the establishment of institutions common to the EU members. EU membership requires the transition countries to bring their legal, political and economic system into conformity with EU standards and to implement effectively the so-called acquis communautaire, which includes many institutional components that are crucial for the functioning of a market economy (cf. Bofinger, 1995) . Deviations from the agreed pattern of institutional reform could entail various sanctions, like formal demands by the European Commission to comply with European Union law or charges before the European Court of Justice. Greater credibility of economic reforms would enhance the speed and the effectiveness of the reforms as economic agents are more likely to believe in policy announcements and to adjust accordingly. EU membership will help to stabilise the democratic pohtical system and promote the development of market-orientated economic institutions -not dissimilar to the experiences of Greece (as far as the pohtical system in concerned), Portugal and Spain, when these countries acceded to the EC in 1981 and 1986 respectively.
In the following I set out in section 2 a simple growth model that accounts for institutional reform, describe in section 3 the concept of credibility, discuss how credibility problems can arise and review in section 4 the credibility problems of the Eastern European countries. In section 5 I examine the effects of institutions on growth and other key macroeconomic variables with the help of the simple econometric model and provide a rough indication of the potential impact of EU integration on economic growth in the CEECs. Section 6 concludes on the results.
A Simple Model of Institutional Reform and Economic Growth
The following analysis is motivated by the question of how EU membership would affect GDP growth in the CEECs. A simple version of a standard growth model with an endogenous saving rate is employed to illustrate the effects of an improvement in economic institutions. To keep the (graphical) representation of the model manageable, the closed economy is depicted first. Later, a modification is introduced to account for the open economy. The economy consists of a representative firm and a representative household (the meaning of the used variables is given in the appendix):
The firm maximises profit according to
with the production function
A represents the level of technology, P the institutions, K capital and L the labour force.
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The production function exhibits constant returns to scale for the inputs, L and K. To simplify the model further, the labour force is set equal to 1, yielding the production function:
The representative household maximises utility according to:
The employed production function Y = AP p K a L' a may be regarded as a modified version of the form Y = AK a L 1^x G 1 a used by Barro (1990) . Barro shows that various activities of a government, described by the variable G, can be viewed as having an effect on the growth rate. The government activities considered by Barro include the provision of infrastructure services, the protection of property rights and the taxation of the economic activity. Cf. also Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) , p. 153. with the left hand side representing the production in the economy and the right hand side the expenditures of the economy.
I assume a utility function with constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the form
, where 6 > 0 (1-0) and 1/6 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The higher 6, the less willing households are to accept deviations from a uniform pattern of C over time.
An improvement in economic institutions (for example in terms of lower transaction costs due to more predictability through EU membership of transition economies) entails an increase in P (equation 3). A phase diagram can represent the response of the economic system to changes in the exogenous variable and can illustrate the transitional dynamics from an initial steady state factor ratio, K*, to the new steady-state ratio, fC* (cf. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), pp.74 and Briicker and Schrettl (1996) ). The two following equations determine the phase diagram of this Ramsey Model (figure 5).
K = F(K)-C-SK
, i.e. the intertemporal resource constraint: the change in the capital stock equals output less consumption and depreciation.
e. the optimality condition for choosing consumption over time:
Depending on the willingness to substitute consumption intertemporally as expressed through 6, the difference between (F' (K) -8) and p determines whether the households chooses a pattern of consumption that rises over time, stays constant or falls. A high value of 0 denotes a low willingness to substitute intertemporally and therefore a small responsiveness to the discrepancy between (F'(K)-8) and p.
The semi-circular line in the phase diagram delineates the combinations of K and C that satisfy K = 0 at the first equation. For values of C above the curve, so much of output is consumed that the depreciated capital stock is not fully replaced and K falls. Similarly, values of C below the curve lead to a rising K.
The vertical line at K* corresponds to the condition C = 0 at the second equation. For values of K smaller than K*, C rises. Conversely, C falls for values of K larger than K*.
For K = 0 and C = 0 the point a at the diagram symbolises the initial steady-state, i.e. the situation in which the quantities K, C and Y grow only at the constant steady-state rate depending on technological change (and population growth). Like in all neo-classical growth models, the steady-state growth rate is not influenced by the parameters describing the production function or by the preference parameters 6 and p representing the household's attitude about saving and consumption. A reduction in the parameters 6 and p indicates an increased willingness to save and would be portrayed in a phase diagram through a shift to the right of the C = 0 schedule, but would leave the K = 0 curve unvaried.
A change in the production technology, in the institutions or in the depreciation rate will given combination of inputs. The transition countries can be considered to have been on point "a" after their capital, technology and institutions that were of no employable worth under market conditions were depreciated. When the market institutions are established, capital productivity will increase and the transition economies will eventually reach the steady-state point d. As institutions-building takes time, of course one would not expect a sudden shift of the K = 0 and C = 0 schedules to their final position. Rather, the curves will wander upwards and to the right in parallel to the establishment of the market institutions.
The phase diagram reveals a range of possible transition paths from the initial steady-state to the new steady-state, depending on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. If the typical household is willing to defer consumption from the present to the future (low value of 0), the investment ratio will be high and the new steady-state will be reached quickly. Under these circumstances, the income gap between Eastern and Western Europe would be narrowed rapidly. In the phase diagram, this scenario would correspond to a sliding down from point a along C = 0 line to the low 6 curve and a quick movement along this curve towards point d.
If the typical household, however, is characterized by a low willingness to substitute intertemporally (high value of 6), consumption will be shifted from the future to the present.
The investment rate will be low and it will take a long time until the new steady state is reached. Hence catching-up will proceed only slowly. In the phase diagram this development would be portrayed through a movement up the C = 0 line starting at point a to the high 6 curve and a very slow wandering along the high 6 curve towards the new steady state. As discussed in the following, low willingness to substitute intertemporally could be an explanation for the observed consumption hike in Portugal, Spain and especially Greece when these countries joined the European Community. Furthermore, a low willingness to substitute intertemporally might also help to explain the sluggish investment behaviour in the CEECs.
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A discrimination among the various scenarios and an analysis of the influence of the institutions for the outward shift of the production function is attempted at the end of the paper. Before the effects are quantified, the interplay between credibility, reforms and growth is examined.
Economic Policy Reforms and Government Credibility
The transition from a socialist to a market economy involves major changes in the political, economic and social system in a short period of time. Major reforms often encounter credibility problems, since the effectiveness of far-reaching changes depends on the willingness of the economic agents to alter their behaviour. The agents will only adjust if they expect the new incentive structures established by the reforms to stay, i.e. the announced reforms have to be credible.
While changes in transition countries are unique in terms of their coverage, the insights from market economies, particularly from developing countries, that have undergone major policy changes and had to overcome credibility problems may be helpful in the analysis of the role of credibility in economic transition. This section analyses the dependence of policy reforms on credibility and discuss the strategies and experiences of overcoming credibility problems.
The credibility of an institutional arrangement or a policy can be defined as the public's subjective probabilistic belief that an arrangement or policy will in fact apply for the relevant time period (Schmieding, 1992) . The greater the difference between the announced government policy and the expected policy, the greater is the credibility problem. The relevant time period is that for which ex ante decisions have to be taken. Policy reforms, for example, trade or price liberalization in developing countries, are initiated in order to achieve welfare gains through increased consumer surplus and through efficient allocation of resources. An efficient allocation following a reform requires the shifting of resources from one sector to another according to the new price signals. Due to sector-specific knowledge and machinery, the transfer from labor and capital between industries induces substantial adjustment costs. The economic agents will be only prepared to shift their resources if they judge to be able to recoup their costs i.e. if the reform is believed to be durable.
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5 A more extended analysis concerning the effects of credibility problems can be found in Rodrik (1989 Rodrik ( , 1991 , Funke (1991 Funke ( , 1993 and Buch ct al. (1994) . Lack of credibility may explain, for example, why so many trade liberalization programs have been aborted. Ibarra (1995) , building on Calvo (1987) , argues that the expectation by the public that an announced trade policy reform will only be short-lived can be self-fulfilling. The expectation that the trade liberalization will be brief leads to an import hike of durable goods due to the assumed low intertemporal price level. The resulting current account deficit might use up the limited international reserves -especially fast in the case of constraints on external borrowing. If the government shuns the political consequences of painful devaluation, it has to establish trade barriers again.
The main sources for credibility problems can be summarised into four categories (cf. Rodrik, 1989) : the government's policies are inconsistent; the government motives are unclear;
the anticipated political costs due to redistribution effects of the policies are high; the macroeconomic environment is unstable. A credible political and economic framework of a society needs clear, enforceable rules that are administered impartially. 6 Especially the failure to ensure the predictability of its actions often leads to credibility problems of a government.
Three different strategies leading to increased credibility are discussed in the literature: 1)
Signalling commitment (Bond et al., 1995) 2) Altering governmental incentives (Bofinger, 1995) and 3) Reducing the scope of governmental manoeuvring (Rodrik, 1989) . Various policies are feasible to follow these strategies: For example, Bond et al. (1995) suggest that the government might even subsidise investment in order to signal commitment and to attract foreign direct investment. However, this policy is also easily reversible and might not convince By pursuing regional integration with a more advanced partner, a reform country government may use all three strategies simultaneously to increase its credibility. Regional integration involves, first, that the government signals its determination to fulfil its own goals and the commitments arising from the institutional integration. Second, the obligations through the institutional setting reduce the possibility of arbitrary changes of policies. Third, the obligations and potential sanctions change the incentive structure of the government. 7 The second strategy -making arbitrary policy shifts less likely -has been stressed recently on political economy grounds with particular reference to the accession of less advanced economies to the EU (cf. Bofinger, 1995) . The "hands-tying" of national governments by the various regulations of the European Union forces the member countries to follow sound economic policies (like keeping their markets completely open vis-a-vis other members). The influence of different national interest groups is consequently reduced, resulting in an increase in predictability of government policies.
Otherwise, the enhancement of credibility through institutional integration between rich and poor countries has been analysed only by few authors. 8 Some important insights can be derived from the experience of institutional integration between rich and poor nations in the case of former enlargements of the then European Community and from the North American Free
Trade Area. In the case of the European Community, trade liberalization in preparation for accession resulted in substantial structural change in the new member states in line with their comparative advantage. Reportedly, factors of production were shifted to labour-intensive activities in Greece and Portugal, whereas Spain and Ireland with their higher wage levels specialised in relatively more sophisticated capital-intensive goods (Ibarra, 1992) . At the same time, Fratzscher (1994) emphasises that successful integration and income convergence depended critically on sound macroeconomic policies and a decisive strong government. In the case of Greece, regional integration alone could not compensate for major domestic policy deficits and reform unwillingness (cf. Nunnenkamp, 1997) . However, in Spain and Portugal, integration into the European Community acted as catalyst for modernisation and market opening.
These experiences suggest that the production frontiers of the southern European countries shifted outwards because of the improvement in economic institutions (cf. phase diagramfigure 5). As I have shown in the previous section, two basic scenarios for the development of the key macroeconomic variables are feasible under these circumstances. When households are willing to defer consumption to future periods (a low value of 6 in the utility function with constant intertemporal substitution) investment will be high and the transition to the new steady state will happen quickly. When households instead choose to smooth consumption (a high value of 6) the investment rate will be low and the economy will need a long time to reach the new steady state.
8 Cf. Georgakopoulos et al. (1994) .
For the cases of Portugal and Spain one can detect a moderate rise of the growth rate of investment between the years 1984 and 1987, while EC accession occurred in 1986 (figure 6).
Similarly, the savings rate increased from 17 percent of GDP in 1984 to 22 percent of GDP in 1987 for Portugal and fluctuated around 22 percent of GDP for Spain (World Bank Data CD-ROM). The GDP growth rate during the second half of the 1980s was also higher than during the first half. Baldwin (1993) regards the experiences of Portugal and Spain at the time of joining the EC therefore as an example of "investment-led" growth. However, figure 6 shows that the increase in the annual growth rates of investment was only temporary. In this respect, the development in Portugal and Spain does not indicate a very high willingness of the households to defer consumption from the present to the future. Consequently, one would expect only a gradual convergence of incomes with the more advanced EU member countries.
The Greek case is a striking example of an extreme "consumption hike". Greece experienced a continuing fall in investment for all but one year in the period between 1980 and 1987, while EC accession took place in 1981 (figure 6). The investment rate in Greece followed the deep fall of the saving rate -although the reduction was less pronounced due to capital inflows.
Capital inflows through foreign direct investment and external transfers may facilitate the adjustment to the new production frontier and finance some investment despite increased domestic consumption. However, judging by the experiences of other countries, capital inflows cannot fully compensate for reduced savings so that even with capital inflows the investment rate can only be marginally higher than the domestic savings rate. In such, the experience of the Southern enlargement demonstrates, on the one hand, that institutional integration leads to extended production possibilities and the consequent welfare gains. On the other hand, however, this does not necessarily imply an investment boom or rapid income convergence.
The trade accord between Mexico and the US and Canada has been analysed by FernandezArias and Spiegel (1996) with respect to its impact on the credibility of the Mexican government. They argue that the primary impact of NAFTA does not lie in the further reduction of already low tariffs between the partners, but in a fundamental change in the attractiveness of Mexico as a location for investment. Fernandez-Arias and Spiegel extend the traditional analysis of customs unions to allow for international capital movements and show how a trade accord may affect the ability of the less developed partner to attract capital. In the model, a Southern nation relies on capital from the North for production in its foreign sector and faces a standard time-inconsistency problem concerning the level of taxation on foreign investment. Hence, foreign investors fear to be taxed in future due to policy reversals ("cheating"). In a wider sense, taxation may be viewed as representing all policies that affect the profitability of FDI. Under the trade accord, the Southern nation commits to national treatment of foreign investment. Fernandez-Arias and Spiegel show that the trade accord can be an effective mechanism for achieving higher foreign investment if it makes the rules for the treatment of foreign investment more credible. Thus, regional integration between a poor and a rich country serves as a credibility-enhancing mechanism.
The NAFTA case also illustrates that enhanced credibility through regional integration need not to be limited to trade policy reforms, but may also extend further to macro-and microeconomic reforms. It has even been stated that, during the NAFTA talks, the Mexican negotiators were more concerned with making unilateral commitments to their partners than with obtaining improved market access in the US or Canada for themselves, in order to "lock in domestic policy reform through this process" (Whalley, 1996, p. 16) . Despite the existence of NAFTA, there was a dramatic downturn in the Mexican domestic demand and a sharp devaluation of the Mexican Peso in December 1994 9 . However, regional integration has helped Mexico substantially to overcome the crisis, since it is questionable whether, in the absence of NAFTA, the US would have mobilised the financial means that permitted the Mexican government to avoid default. In this respect, regional integration provided "insurance" cover to Mexico, reducing planning uncertainties for the economic agents (cf. Fernandez, 1997).
Enhancing Government Credibility in Central and Eastern Europe through EU Membership
Even if one accepts that regional integration may enhance the credibility of policy reforms in the transition countries of CEE, the rapid progress made especially by the candidates for EU membership in recent years raises the question of whether these countries still face any major credibility problems. It is noteworthy, however, that progress was greatest in the areas of macroeconomic stabilisation and microeconomic adjustment and less pronounced in institutional reforms. Furthermore, the initial successful reforms were based on three essentially temporary factors that enhanced the ability of the governments to organise credible reforms.
First, the neighbouring developed market economies could be used as examples for the design 9 Langhammer and Schweickert (1995) discuss the various reasons of the Mexican Peso crisis.
of economic policies. In that respect, the motives of the government were clear. However, policy decisions have become more and more technically complicated, and straight forward examples have become rare (e.g. in the case of financial sector reforms). Second, there was a wide-spread consensus among the population about the direction of the political and economic transition and only few well-organised interest groups fighting economic reforms. This reduced the expected political cost of the income redistribution associated with economic transition and increased thereby the government's credibility. By now, various interest groups have gained strength and resist reforms that endanger their privileges and incomes. Third, the CEECs were dominated by a state-orientated understanding of society. Consequently, the governments could push through their transition policies without a long-winded process of public consensus-finding. As a result of the transition progress, democracy is now taking hold and a civil society is emerging, which will delay the decision-finding process (cf. Wiesenthal, 1995) .
Because of these increasing difficulties, the commitment to further reforms has considerably weakened in all transition countries, particularly in the area of institutional reforms. Even the Czech Republic -once praised as a prime example of reform-led transition -stalled in the process of privatisation and has postponed price-liberalization in important areas. In Poland, privatisation has been completed for less than 20 percent of former state-owned enterprises, while for more than 50 percent the privatisation process had not started by the beginning of 1996. Furthermore, in most transition countries inappropriate legal rules and their insufficient and often arbitrary application delay the economic recovery. For example, bankruptcy law is not applied consistently for state-owned firms and, as a result, obsolete industries continue to receive subsidies while the necessary restructuring of the economy is postponed (cf. Buch and Heinrich, 1997) . The CEECs have in common that reforms in the financial sector still have a long way to go, that public procurement has to be reformed and that financial constraints will necessitate a major overhaul in the areas of health care and social security. Additionally, corruption has increased dramatically in the last years in CEE, leading to distorted price signals and undermining credibility (cf. World Development Report, 1997).
In the process of economic transition, institutional reforms, structural adjustment and moacroeconomic stabilisation are strongly interdependent. Widespread failure to fully implement institutional reforms therefore creates serious doubts about the governments' willingness and ability to bring economic transition to a successful conclusion. In this situation, institutional integration with the European Union provides guidance with respect to the 14 contents of further reforms and also enhances the credibility of transition country governments.
The Europe agreements between the EU and the CEECs and the prospect of EU membership have already helped to stabilise expectations about the direction of future policies and the structure of the economic and legal systems in the CEECs. EU accession will further decrease uncertainty about the long-term development of the CEECs through the EU's far-reaching coverage and institutional framework.
Institutional integration is presently based on the Europe Agreements (concluded between the EU and Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Institutional integration will be advanced through full EU membership which requires the implementation and the maintenance of the acquis communautaire and will effectively bind the 15 domestic economic policies of the CEECs. 10 The "key-components" of the acquis communautaire which are most relevant for joining members have been outlined by the European Commission in the 1995 "White Paper" (Commission, 1995) and can be regarded to represent best practice of institutional setting in the EU. The EU demands from every candidate country to "commit itself permanently to the economic obligations of membership"
and irreversible adoption of the acquis communautaire "to provide the certainty that every part of the enlarged EU market will continue to operate by common rules" (Commission, 1997).
The adaptation of CEECs' laws to the acquis communautaire can proceed either through the revision of existing laws or through new national legislation on the basis of EU law. The greatest reforms in domestic legislation will be connected to the fields in which the members of the EU carry out common policies like in customs issues or agricultural sector regulations. The
Commission emphasises that it is important to incorporate the acquis communautaire into national legislation effectively, but even more important to implement it properly via the appropriate administrative and judicial structures set up in the Member States.
Questionable practices will have to be judged by the European Commission and the
European partners with reference to EU law. The Commission has the duty to ensure that all economic agents within the EU are able to operate under the same conditions. These include the obligations covering freedom of establishment, national treatment and free trade, the rules on competition, harmonisation of the rules on company law and accountancy, harmonisation of the rules on intellectual property, the opening-up of public works, supply and services, tax measures, protection of personal data, implementation of proceedings and the recognition of judgements. Failure to conform to the acquis communautaire could entail substantial costs for the deviating government. This is especially the case due to the strong political component of the EU opening up multiple channels to sanction violations of EU regulations. Since the costs of exit are high, the maintenance of domestic policies in accordance to the EU rules is credible.
Consequently, EU membership will be able to serve as a mechanism for the CEECs to commit themselves credibly to sound domestic policies.
The following analysis in this paper concentrates on the impact of EU institutions for the CEECs and on transitional growth. The establishment and enforcement of EU type rules and regulations would represent a major advancement for the transition countries with their heritage of the socialist system and a yet underdeveloped institutional setting. Index based on De Melo and Gelb (1996) to analyse how far the CEECs are away from Brussels in terms of adopting a market-based system. They find that economic distance from Brussels increases with geographical distance from Brussels. Furthermore, based on regressions following Barro type as well as Levine and Renelt type growth analysis, they conclude that it will take the CEECs about 30 years on average to catch up with the income levels of low-income EU countries. Knack and Keefer (1995) use an index based on Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI) data about institutional maturity measured with reference to infrastructural quality, contract enforceability, bureaucratic delays and nationalisation risks to derive the influence of the institutional setting on GDP changes. They adapt standard (Barro type) growth regressions by regressing GDP growth rate on initial income, investment in human capital, government consumption, the development of relative prices for investment goods and the BERI index. They find a significant positive growth elasticity of the BERI index. However, the BERI data do not exist for most transition countries.
The following analysis uses an indicator developed by the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) that covers institutional change in 25 transition countries. 12 In the 1996 Transition Report, the progress in transition towards a market economy is assessed in nine different areas covering enterprise privatisation and restructuring, price and trade liberalisation, financial and legal reforms. The achievements are ranked on a scale ranging from 1 (i.e. no or little progress) up to 5 (i.e. standards and performance comparable to advanced industrial countries) (table 2) . To obtain a general indicator of institutional change (IIC), the values for the nine areas are added. One could argue that differing weights should be given to certain sub-areas of the IIC; e.g. Sachs and Warner (1995) suggest that trade and foreign exchange reform is the most critical area for growth, whereas Fischer et al. (1997) argue that privatisation is decisive. Furthermore, it could be claimed that price liberalisation should be emphasised more since prices reflecting the relative scarcity of the goods are essential for the efficient allocation of resources and for long-term growth. Every weighting will be arbitrary and this paper will follow Sachs (1996) EBRD (1996) , Sachs (1996) , own calculations.
The "hat A " denotes the relative changes of the variables. The net change in the capital stock, K, can be calculated by subtracting depreciation from gross investment.
Combining (7) and (8) 
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K I 13 This is done by combining data for the capital coefficient, -, the gross investment ratio, -, and the depreciation rate, 8 = -, with 8 representing the depreciation rate relative to capital / K and "Depr" the value of depreciation. 14 Since the capital coefficient and the depreciation rate are assumed to be equal across countries, the choice of value does not influence the regression results. However, to interpret the coefficient of the investment measure, the employed values are given: capital coefficient = 3; Depr./Y = 0.1.
For the regression with change in GDP per capita (cf. The coefficient attached to the indicator of institutional change is positive and significant as expected. However, the investment variable is not significant, which suggests that my estimate of the net change in the capital stock in equation (9) bears little relation to the capital stock actually utilised. This may be due to the fact that the capital stock left over from the socialist period has been taken out of use only gradually, so that the assumption of a uniform depreciation rate is misleading. The constant is technically an estimate of the rate of technical progress (A = y) in equation (9), which is assumed equal for all countries. However, the negative and significant constant reflects the extent of the output collapse during the first few years of the transition. 16 Since the investment variable may be of doubtful quality equation (9) is re-estimated without this variable using the change in GDP per capita as dependent variable The causes of the substantial fall in aggregate output in the transition countries have been discussed extensively in the literature (cf. Langhammer and Liicke, 1997) . 17 The IIC reflects the institutional setting in the transition countries as estimated by the EBRD for the year 1996. The impact of the IIC on growth will be understated, since not all effects of growthenhancing institutional change could materialise during the period under coverage. -4.5 -4.5 -A.I -1.1 -4.5 -7.7 -12.5 -1.7 -9.0 -6.6 -6.0 -9.0 -13.1 0.8 -2.1 -9.8 -0.9 -0.6 -11.6 -7.4 -9. The coefficient /J in equation (9) on which this estimate of the growth bonus is based indicates the "static" effect of improved institutions with no change in the capital stock.
However, in the neo-classical growth model presented in section 2 higher marginal productivity of capital stimulates capital formation and leads to an increase in the steady-state capital stock and, therefore, in steady-state per-capita income. This additional "dynamic" effect is difficult to quantify, but several attempts have been made in the case of the growth effect of the completion of the European Single Market in 1992. Baldwin (1989 Baldwin ( , 1993 looks at various approaches and concludes that for the completion of the Single Market, the additional growth effect is at least of the same order of magnitude as the "static" effect and could be up to twice its size. Therefore, the entire growth bonus of EU institutions for the CEECs could be in the range between 18 percent and 27 percent of additional GDP.
20
18 The Slovak Republic has an IIC of 31, and the European Commission has acknowledged in its "avis"
of July 1997 that this country is as advanced as the Czech Republic or Poland in its economic transition. However, lacking political progress towards a civil and democratic society in the Slovak Republic led the Commission to the recommendation to postpone the start of accession talks.
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19 IIC = -= = 0.31; Consequently, the expected growth bonus can be calculated as 0.31*29.6 equalling 9.18 percent. 20 Incidentally, the above analysis permits no conclusion with respect to the long-run expected level of GDP per capita in the transition economies, since the employed production function does not determine the point when the economies are in their new steady state. However, the question about These figures for expected growth changes should be seen as a "sound institutional setting" bonus reflecting improved economic institutions. 21 The importance of EU accession in this context lies in enhancing the credibility of reforms so that the improvements can actually be implemented. Concerning the importance of policies conducive to enhancing the functioning of the market economy, the paper arrives to conclusions similar to the ones of Sachs and Warner (1996) and Barbone and Zalduendo (1997) . Whereas these authors have focused on the convergence issue combining the economic fundamentals of the CEECs with econometric estimations derived from "world-wide" cross-country analysis, my paper has establishes the growth enhancing effects of institutions within the specialised range of the experiences of the transition countries. criteria to define the expected level of GDP in the CEECs at the end of the transition and thereby the duration of the catching up period could be answered crudely by historical comparisons: In 1935 as well as in 1955 the level of real GDP per capita in Hungary was about the level of real GDP per capita in Greece, but fell to 79 percent in 1970 and to 55 percent in 1992 (Maddison, 1995) . Consequendy, one could argue, that the catching up period of the CEECs will last at least until they have reached the per-capita income level of the present poor EU members.
Conclusions and Further Research
Even in the more advanced transition economies, economic and institutional reforms have been implemented inconsistently or have been stalled. In this paper it has been argued that the prospect of EU membership will both require and facilitate further reforms and will thereby lead to increased government credibility in the CEECs. An estimate of the potential growth affect resulting from improved economic institutions through EU membership has been derived suggesting the possibility of a "static" growth bonus in GDP of 9 percent (not accounting for induced capital accumulation) and an additional "dynamic" growth bonus of up to 18 percent.
This should be regarded as a rule-of-thumb approximation and as a point of departure for further more in depth studies. Such research should analyse other indicators of credibility, like expected returns of investment or credit-ranking of various countries. Furthermore, it would be desirable to include in the model the adjustment costs in the production side of the economy.
Adapting the CEECs' institutions according to the EU acquis communautaire will help to establish a functioning market-orientated framework and to lay the foundation for catching-up with the EU income levels. However, the paper also showed that the speed of convergence depends heavily on the willingness to substitute consumption intertemporally, i.e. the willingness to forego present for future consumption. The low saving and investment to GDP ratios in the CEECs imply that income convergence with the incumbent EU members will take a long time, although positive welfare effects through higher consumption will be felt already in the short run.
Appendix Model Extension to include FDI
The model employed in the paper can be also used to estimate the impact of changes in the institutional setting on FDI inflows and to derive an estimate of the impact of the EU on capital inflows: FDI inflows occur if the return to capital is higher than in the rest of the world. Due to adjustment costs the inflows are not so high as to equilibrate the return to capital in all countries immediately. If everything is kept equal, a one point increase in the IIC would raise on average the FDIinflows per capita by more than US $ 8 per year. Similar to the reasoning in the main part of the paper, fulfilment of the requirements of the acquis communautaire by the advanced transition countries would equal an increase of the IIC by 10 points leading to a boost in FDIinflows by more than $ 80 per capita. -1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Sources: International Monetary Fund (1996); Eurostat (1997) ; own calculations.
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Central and Eastern Europe (CEE): Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic. 
